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Border Patrol

by Carl E. Schneider
cently, the Supreme Court has
ncountered cases that concern
erhaps our weightiest bioethical
issue-how medical care is to be rationed. But this does not mean that the
Court must therefore assess the justice of
rationing, as many people incited by
many journalists now fondly and firmly
believe. In explaining why, we begin
with a story about how Learned Hand
remembered saying one day to Justice
Holmes, "Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!" Holmes turned quite sharply and
said: "That is not my job. My job is to
play the game according to the rules."
If the Court doesn't do justice, what
does it do? Partly, it does the crucial if
dismal work of interpreting ambiguous
federal statutes. But more centrally, the
Supreme Court is a border guard that
confines legal actors within the boundaries of their authority. It shows them
where the frontiers are and sends them
packing when they cross illegally. It
tends the borders between individuals
and their governments, between the
state and federal governments, among
the branches of the federal government,
and even within branches of government, especially the judiciary.
The Court is additionally constrained from grappling with what justice requires by its border-patrol methods. Borders are best which are clear;
good fences make good neighbors. The
Court thus devises and deploys brightline rules and rules of thumb, rules that
sacrifice something in justice to achieve
something in efficiency. Such rules give
legal actors relatively clear notice of
10

where the boundaries are and how
boundary disputes will be resolved, thus
reducing the many costs of uncertainty
and litigation.
Consider Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers ofAmerica v. Walsh. 1
In 2000, Maine proved that Yankee ingenuity is not dead by adopting the
"Maine Rx Program." Maine Rx used
the state's buying power to negotiate
lower drug costs for Medicaid patients.
It then asked drug companies to sell
their products at the lower rate to all
Maine residents. Should a company
refuse, the state would make its drugs
available to Medicaid patients only on
advance approval.
An association of drug companies
challenged Maine Rx in federal court.
But you can't just tell a court you don't
like a statute or even that it's foolish. You
need a legal argument. What could the
drug companies say? If the people of
Maine acting through their legislature
want to do foolish things or wise things
companies don't like, they may.
The Framers of the Constitution
gave the states primary authority to legislate in areas of domestic concern, like
health care. However, the federal government may spend money and regulate
interstate commerce, and in the last century it used this authority to reach
deeply into areas originally confided to
the states. A classic example is Medicaid.
Congress made the states an offer they
could not refuse: It proffered contributions to health care programs for the
poor if the states would adopt programs
that met various federal standards. The

states acceded, and Congress enacted
Medicaid.
Maine, you will recall, used Medicaid
funds to pressure drug companies to
lower their rates for everyone. The drug
companies argued that the Maine
statute (Maine Rx) therefore conflicted
with the federal statute (Medicaid). The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
provides that federal law preempts conflicting state law. The drug companies,
then, did not contend that Maine Rx
was unfair or that it recklessly disrupted
free markets; they contended that Medicaid preempts Maine Rx. In other
words, they said Maine had crossed the
borders of its authority.
There are boundaries within the judicial branch, and one of them allocates to
the District Courts (federal trial courts)
the initial authority to hear claims. The
drug companies-now the petitionersasked such a court to declare the law invalid and to issue a preliminary injunction putting the law in abeyance during
the litigation since, they said, they were
being irreparably damaged by a law that
was surely void. To receive the injunction, they had to show that they would
probably convince the court by the end
of the litigation that the statute was invalid.
The petitioners introduced affidavits
contending that prior-approval requirements deter doctors from prescribing
drugs. If so, said the petitioners, Medicaid recipients were hindered from receiving some drugs (those of companies not
acquiescing in Maine Rx) in order to
serve the interests of non-Medicaid recipients (everybody else in Maine).
Maine replied, so what? The Medicaid
statute allows us to require prior approval, and it matters not why we
choose to do so.
The district court disagreed and
granted the preliminary injunction.
Maine went to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which
quashed the injunction. The petitioners
asked the Supreme Court to hear them,
and the Supreme Court agreed.
The Supreme Court confronted two
boundary disputes: one between the federal government and Maine, and one between the district court and the appel-
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late court. But the Supreme Court did
not try to identify optimal borders between the actors. Rather, it used rules of
thumb to simplify its analysis. Unfortunately, those rules were not entirely consistent with each other. Indeed, so inconsistent were they that, while six justices joined in upholding the First Circuit's decision, they could not agree on a
reason.
Essentially, the majority invoked two
rules of thumb. First: state statutes presumptively do not conflict with federal
statutes. In interpreting statutes, courts
generally defer to democratically elected
bodies and assume that legislatures are
acting legitimately and that federal and
state governments are cooperating. If
this means a court sustains a state statute
that Congress thinks impedes a federal
statute, then Congress can always exercise its power of preemption more explicitly. Furthermore, as one justice
noted, Congress had already protected
its Medicaid statute by authorizing the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to reject important aspects of state
Medicaid plans. Finally, buttressing this
first rule of thumb was a second: preliminary injunctions are disfavored, since
they are issued before any court has
heard all the evidence and arguments.
In light of these two rules of thumb,
the majority subjected Maine Rx only to
sympathetic scrutiny. Maine Rx did not
conflict with the Medicaid statute because the justices could imagine ways
Maine Rx promotes Medicaid goals:
Maine Rx serves medically needy people, just as the Medicaid does. Making
drugs cheaper might help people remain
healthy enough to stay off the Medicaid
rolls, thus saving Medicaid dollars. And
prior authorization would actually benefit Medicaid clients, since it would discourage doctors from prescribing inappropriate drugs and encourage them to
prescribe cheaper ones.
The three dissenters relied on yet a
third rule of thumb: appellate courts
should overturn preliminary injunctions
only if the trial court "abused its discretion" in issuing it. Appellate courts are
loath to say a trial court has abused its
discretion, so the rule of thumb basically means that in these matters appellate
july-August 2003

courts should defer to trial courts,
which are closer to the evidence and the
situation than appellate courts. In addition, courts want to discourage "interlocutory appeals," appeals before the
trial court has issued its final decision,
since they can prolong litigation and can
require appellate courts to confront
questions that might have been resolved
had the litigation proceeded uninterrupted.
Animated by this rule of thumb, the
dissenters thought the Medicaid purposes the majority attributed to Maine
Rx absurdly speculative. The dissenters
observed that the trial court had held no
hearings and that there was thus no evidence that Maine Rx would actually
promote those purposes. And the dissenters said, Come on, it's obvious that
Maine Rx puts barriers between Medicaid patients and the drugs of companies
that resist the pressure of Maine Rx.
Furthermore, if Maine Rx could use
Medicaid to raise money to subsidize
drug purchases by non-Medicaid patients, what stops states from using their
Medicaid power to raise money for
ridiculously unrelated projects like
building bridges?
So what does this case tell us about
the desirability of any rationing method
or any other health care issue? Nothing.
The Court did not even decide whether
the Medicaid statute preempts Maine
Rx. The Court concluded that the trial
court abused its discretion in issuing the
preliminary injunction, but this just
means that the plaintiffs are back in the
District Court seeking a permanent injunction. They have not yet had, but
presumably will want, a chance to prove
that Maine Rx impedes the Medicaid
statute. And the HHS Secretary may
still attempt to use his authority to cause
Maine to repeal its statute.
Indeed, one might wonder whether
the Supreme Court did not violate one
of its own rules of thumb. The Court's
principal job is not to correct errors by
courts below. Litigants have one bite at
that apple, and that is in the Courts of
Appeal. The Supreme Court's principal
job is to resolve disagreement among
those Courts of Appeal about points of
law and, where an issue is exceptionally

important, to advise those courts even
before disagreements arise. The Court's
rule of thumb is thus something like
"when in doubt, refuse to hear a case."
The Court receives requests in thousands of cases and typically rejects all
but about a hundred.
Were I a justice, I would have voted
to "DIG" the case-to "dismiss" the petition for certiorari as "improvidently
granted." The Court granted that petition because "the questions presented
are of national importance." Perhaps,
but "national importance" usually
means really important; for example, is
the draft unconstitutional? In any event,
the Court took the case before the trial
court had gathered evidence and made a
final ruling, before the HHS Secretary
had proffered his department's expert
views, before the First Circuit had contributed its mature reflections, and before the various Courts of Appeal had
begun their conversation. The Court
consequently had little evidence about
Maine Rx's actual effects and little help
in deciding whether it affronted the
Medicaid statute. Perhaps consequently,
the Court could proffer no lucid guidance to lower courts or the state and federal governments.
But such is life on border patrol. This
is constitutional law in a literal sense.
The Constitution constitutes a government. The Supreme Court tries to ensure that its constituent parts work and
work together as the Framers intended.
To interpret the Court's pursuit of that
assignment as an attempt to assess the
wisdom and justice of legislation is to
mistake steel for silver. 2 Steel may lack
the glitter, but it's got the strength, and
it should be assayed and appreciated for
what it is.
1. 123 S Ct 1855 (May 19, 2003).
2. While it is not the Court's assignment to
decide what justice requires, it is conventionally said that its members cannot help being influenced even in border-patrol work by their
private sense of the justice of the policies at
stake. No doubt. But consider that the majority here comprised Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Scalia, and Thomas and that
the dissenters were Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
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